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We examine integration of financial markets and banking sectors in Central and
Eastern Europe and the euro area. We study co-movements between government
bond and equity markets of Germany and those of Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary,
as well as Slovenia and Slovakia (the two recent euro members). We assume that
financial integration is essential for subsequent monetary convergence, as it will
enable the euro candidates to mitigate systemic risk and avert potentially desta-
bilizing shocks. Government bond yields of the Czech Republic and Poland show
high correlation with German yields, in contrast to those of the remaining coun-
tries. Equity returns of Slovenia and Slovakia show no correlation with German
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INTRODUCTION
Integration of financial markets within a common currency area has been
rather downplayed in the classic optimum currency area literature. Yet, we
believe that it is an important condition for survival of a unified currency
system. Equally important is integration of aspiring financial markets with
those in the common currency system. The effects of the recent global financial
crisis, particularly the widening of sovereign risk premiumwithin the euro area
suggests that more scholarly research on integration and financial stability
within the common currency system ought to be pursued.
Following this premise, our paper aims to investigate the transmission of
shocks from the German government bond and equity markets, as a proxy for
the euro-area markets, to the markets of Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries. We analyze the degree and the time pattern of these shocks. We also
examine integration of the banking sectors in these countries with that in the
euro area. Because of limited scope of this study, we leave behind other
aspects of financial integration.
We focus mainly on financial markets of the CEE countries that joined the
European Union (EU) as of May 2004. We divide them into two groups. The
first group includes the euro candidates that are currently pursuing indepen-
dent monetary policies with flexible exchange rates, namely, Czech Republic,
Poland and Hungary. The second group consists of countries that have
adopted the euro, that is, Slovenia and Slovakia, as of January 2007 and
January 2009, respectively. We study the susceptibility of government bond
and equity markets in these countries to shocks generated in German markets
by applying vector autoregression (VAR) with impulse response functions. The
same methodology is applied to examine vulnerability of their equity markets
to shocks from the US Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). We further
investigate integration of banking sectors of the five analyzed countries with
that of the euro area. Our guiding hypothesis is that a deeper integration of
financial markets results in declining financial risk premia, particularly with
respect to sovereign default risk and interest rate risk.
We further note that the recent financial crisis has disrupted integration in
the examined region, particularly in the countries with weaker macroeconomic
fundamentals (Hungary). The crisis did a little damage to financial integration
of the countries pursuing more disciplined macroeconomic policies (Czech
Republic and Poland). Further progress in financial integration is necessary to
ensure future smooth adoption of the euro without increasing sovereign
default risk and destabilizing the financial system and the real economy.
We begin our analysis with a review of the pertinent literature in the next
section, followed by the investigation of the government bond markets in the
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subsequent section. In the section after that we examine the susceptibility of
the CEE equity markets to external shocks. Integration of their banking sectors
is analyzed in the penultimate section. Our findings are summarized in the
final section.
IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION FOR MONETARY
INTEGRATION
Integration of financial markets is proven to be among the primary conditions
for monetary integration, that is, adoption of a single currency by participating
states, as argued among others by Kenen (1969) in hisQ5 version of the optimum
currency area theory. Financial integration and stability achieved before entry
to a monetary union is likely to help mitigate macroeconomic risk and allow for
the national real economy to adjust more effectively to external shocks (Lama
and Rabanal, 2012).
A debatable point in the literature is whether there is an ex post or an ex ante
causal relationship between a currency union and financial stability (Bayoumi
and Eichengreen, 1999; Pisani-Ferry, 2012). Specifically, it has been debated
whether a currency union would engender gains in financial stability or whether
financial stability should be accomplished before currency union. The recent
literature on the euro area focuses mainly on its ex posts effects on financial
stability (Obstfeld, 2013). Our study aims instead at the reversed causal impact.
In our view, achieving financial stability and thus a low systemic and sovereign
risk environment should be viewed as a prerequisite for adopting the euro.
There are some studies worth noting on this point. Among others, Kose
et al. (2006) recognize that emerging market economies ought to establish
sufficiently deep domestic financial markets for companies to be adequately
well managed and for macroeconomic policy to be disciplined. With respect to
monetary integration in Europe, several authors have demonstrated that the
introduction of the euro alone does not result in a full convergence of bond
yields and that harmonization of disciplined national macroeconomic policies
plays a significant role. Bernoth et al. (2004) show that the debt and deficit
indicators, primarily the debt-service ratio, significantly affect long-term
interest rate risk premia in the euro area. They show that deeper fiscal deficits
and higher public debt levels tend to increase long-term interest rates. In
addition, the fiscal position has direct bearing on the default risk premium as it
is reflected in the government credit rating. Before the recent global financial
crisis, fiscal discipline gains in the euro area have contributed to the successful
convergence of bond yields to historically low levels. Gjersem (2003) attributes
the positive term spreads on treasury securities within the euro area to the
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differences in governments’ credit ratings and liquidity, as well as the country’s
issuance techniques. Danthine et al. (2001) and Hartman et al. (2003) alsoQ6 point
to the prolonged segmentation of the government bond market across the euro
area, which exacerbates liquidity risk in the smaller, more vulnerable markets
and results in yield differentials across similar class of government issues. They
provide evidence that further fiscal convergence, specifically in debt-to-GDP
ratios, is indispensable for reducing yield differentials. Nevertheless, Pagano and
von Thadden (2004) assert that in spite of their successful convergence during
the transition to the euro, sovereign bonds in the euro area are not perfect
substitutes. In more recent studies, Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) show that
government bond yield differentials are affected by changes in short-term
interest rates, which in turn are driven by market liquidity, cyclical conditions
and the investors’ incentives to take risk. In addition, Beber et al. (2009) argue
that in times of market distress bond investors chase liquidity and not credit
quality. Such investors’ preferences contributed to a rise in liquidity risk and,
ultimately, to the widening government bond spreads in the euro area during
the recent financial crisis (Monfort and Renne, 2013).
Other studies analyzing government bond markets emphasize the impor-
tance of harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies for mitigating sovereign
risk in countries converging to the euro. Côté and Graham (2004) find evidence
that currency risk premia declined gradually following the adoption of the
Maastricht Treaty and were essentially eliminated by the time the euro was
launched in January 1999. They argue that progress in macroeconomic policy
harmonization was the prevalent driver of long-term bond yield convergence.
According to their study, the introduction of a common currency had merely a
secondary effect. Thus, they confirm the previous findings that convergence of
national long-term yields results predominantly from the coordination of
disciplined fiscal and monetary policies.
With respect to integration of sovereign bond and equity markets of the
CEE countries that have become EU Member States as of May 2004, empirical
studies show mixed results. On a skeptical side, Kim et al. (2006) argue that
government bond market integration is weak, in spite of substantial progress in
political and overall economic integration. The opposite evidence can be found
in Orbán and Szapáry (2004), Orlowski and Lommatzsch (2005) and Orlowski
(2003, 2005), all showing substantial progress in bond yield convergence
between the new and the existing EU members before and shortly after the
2004 EU accession. This progress was achieved through effective preparations
for accession, mainly through the interplay of two factors. The first one was the
anticipation of entry to the euro (as stipulated by the EU accession conditions)
that resulted in lower sovereign risk premia. The second factor was the
improvement in macroeconomic fundamentals that stemmed in part from
LT Orlowski & A Tsibulina
Integration of Central and Eastern European
4
Comparative Economic Studies
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
harmonization of national macroeconomic policies. In addition, technological
progress and more favorable regulatory framework for bond issuance con-
tributed further to integration of sovereign bond markets (Orlowski and
Lommatzsch, 2005). Nevertheless, integration was not fully achieved by CEE
countries before their EU accession. Among factors deterring full integration
was elevated exchange rate risk that stemmed from the shift in monetary
policy from exchange-rate-based to autonomous inflation targeting policies
with flexible exchange rates.1 This argument follows Frankel et al. (2004) who
show that international transmission of bond yields is slower and more
staggered under flexible than under fixed exchange rates. In the aftermath of
the recent financial crisis, the yield spreads between the new and the existing
EU members have widened, mainly as a result of absorption of crisis-induced
exogenous shocks by the euro candidates (Gabrisch and Orlowski, 2010).
The negative impact of spillover effects of the financial crisis on financial
market integration between the new and the established EU Member States is
confirmed in the recent literature. Among others, Jiménez-Rodriguez et al.
(2010) and Gabrisch et al. (2012) show strong transmission of foreign shocks on
the financial sector and the real economy in CEE. While equity and bond
markets in the countries with more stable fundamentals and credible, indepen-
dent monetary policies are more resilient to external shocks, the less stable new
EU members are subject to elevated volatility. In addition, the euro candidates
are adversely affected by the exchange rate risk. All this volatility results in
pronounced tail risks, that is, much higher leptokurtosis in the distribution of
time series of asset prices and interest rates (Orlowski, 2012; Gabrisch and
Orlowski, 2011). It ultimately exacerbates sovereign default risk.2
In the next two sections we examine selected aspects of financial integration
as reflected by co-movements between government bond and equity markets of
CEE countries and those of Germany. Our analysis is conducted over three
subperiods: ‘pre-EU accession’ (January 2001–April 2004), ‘accession to crisis’
(May 2004–August 2007) and ‘crisis to recent’ (August 2007–July 2013).
GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS: CORRELATION AND SHOCK ABSORPTION
Government bond yields in the examined CEE countries show convergence to
the euro area from the beginning of the preparatory period for the EU accession
1 See Golinelli and Rovelli (2005) and Orlowski (2005, 2008) for a detailed description of inflation
targeting policies, their transmission mechanisms and repercussions for sovereign bond markets in
CEE.
2 See Gabrisch et al. (2012) for further evidence on the key drivers of elevated sovereign risk
premia in the euro-periphery and the euro-candidate countries.
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until the onset of the financial crisis in August 2007.3 This convergence, as
reflected by spreads between the three euro candidates and the German 10Y
government bond yields is shown in Figure 1a. The crisis has visibly disrupted
the convergence process. The spreads for Hungary, Poland and the Czech
Republic began to rise with the onset of the crisis, implying divergence of
sovereign risk premia. The peak of divergence happened in the first quarter of
2009, that is, several months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September
of 2008. There are also some visible contagion effects from the sovereign debt
crisis in Greece and other euro-periphery countries, manifested by episodes of
the elevated sovereign risk in the euro area in mid-2010 and again at the end of
2011. The bond yield convergence process resumed when the sovereign debt
crisis in Europe started to subside in the beginning of 2012. Within the examined
group of countries, Hungarian sovereign risk premium was the highest because
of its weakest fiscal fundamentals. It was oscillating around the level of 400 basis
points in July 2013. At the same time, the risk premium for Poland was around
200 basis points while for the Czech Republic it was close to 0.
As shown in Figure 1b, the spreads between the local and the German 10Y
government bonds for Slovenia and Slovakia followed a similar pattern to that
of the three euro candidates until 2011 when the two euro countries were
experiencing economic recession. Before the outbreak of the financial crisis,
both countries’ risk premia were reduced to a near-zero level. They were
moving closely together in spite of the different timing of the euro adoption
(January 2007 by Slovenia and January 2009 by Slovakia). Following the
outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis that reverberated across the euro
area, the risk premia for Slovenia and Slovakia assumed a different path. The
risk premium for Slovenia reached the highest level among the five examined
CEE countries, oscillating around 500 basis points in mid-2013. The Slovak risk
premium resumed a declining pattern with the improving economic outlook in
mid-2012. The case of Slovenia shows that the euro adoption alone does not
provide an implicit guarantee against sovereign default risk. The elevated level
and volatility of the Slovenian sovereign risk premium implies this country
vulnerability to external contagion effects.
Co-movements between the sovereign bond markets of CEE countries and
those of Germany can be further explained by the correlation coefficients
shown in Table 1. Correlation between the Czech and German as well as
the Polish and German 10Y government bonds has been continuously high.
3We assume that the global financial crisis began with the collapse of two hedge funds managed
by Bear Stearns in mid-August 2007 (see Orlowski, 2008 for further explanation). That triggered a
subprime mortgage crisis in the United States and subsequently the global credit crunch and the
systemic crisis that peaked with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008.
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Figure 1: (a) Spreads between local and German 10Y government bondQ12 yields: Poland, Czech Republic
and Hungary
Daily series, 3 January 2001–23 July 2013 sample period (3270 observations). Spreads are denoted as
Pol-Ger for Poland, Hun-Ger for Hungary and Cze-Ger for the Czech Republic
Data Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream
(b) Spreads between local and German 10Y government bond yields: Slovakia and Slovenia
Daily series: 3 January 2001–23 July 2013 sample period for Slovakia and 18 March 2003–23 July 2013
for Slovenia. Spreads are denoted as Slk-Ger for Slovakia and Slv-Ger for Slovenia
Data Source: as in Figure 1a
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In both cases, correlation increased during the period of active preparations for
the EU accession, that is, before May 2004. This high correlation signifies
considerable gains in macroeconomic stability in both the Czech Republic and
Poland. However, after the EU accession, correlation became lower; more
considerably for Poland than for the Czech Republic, presumably underscoring
some relaxation of the Polish macroeconomic discipline. During our latest
analyzed period (crisis to recent), correlation has increased for both countries,
showing continuous gains in macroeconomic stability and narrowing of
sovereign risk premia. Correlation between the Slovak and German bond
markets was also high before the EU accession. Since then it has entered a
declining path that accelerated with the onset of the financial crisis showing
vulnerability of this small euro member to contagion effects.
Correlation between German and Hungarian bond yields is considerably
and continuously lower than that of German and the Czech, Polish and Slovak.
It remained low during and after the financial crisis. This low co-movement
indicates some decoupling of the Hungarian from the German bond market.
The deterioration of the country’s fiscal discipline, along with the recent
concerns about central bank’s independence and, therefore, about credibility
of monetary policy are among the contributing factors to the high government
bond yields in Hungary (Horváth et al. 2011).
Slovenian bond yields are negatively correlated with the German yields
during the latest analyzed period (crisis to recent) as it can be expected based
on the recessionary conditions in Slovenia discussed above. The negative
correlation stems from increases in Slovenian yields as a consequence of
capital outflows to low-risk German bonds and the resulting decline in German
Table 1: Correlation coefficients between local and German 10Y government bond yields daily series:
3 January 2001–23 July 2013 sample period (3270 observations)
Correlation between 3 January 2001–30
April 2004
(pre-EU accession)
3 May 2004–15
August 2007
(accession to crisis)
16 August 2007–23
July 2013
(crisis to recent)
Czech and German
10YGB
0.807 0.767 0.849
Polish and German
10YGB
0.824 0.522 0.718
Hungarian and German 10YGB 0.172 0.484 0.263
Slovak and German
10YGB
0.899 0.785 0.501
Slovenian and German 10YGB 0.728 0.786 −0.435
Note: Slovenian bond yields as of 18 March 2003, others for the entire sample period.
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on Thomson Reuters Datastream data
LT Orlowski & A Tsibulina
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yields. This divergent path of bond yields underscores financial vulnerability of
Slovenia.
To provide further insights into the transmission of shocks between the
euro area and each of the CEE countries’ government bond markets, we
conduct the vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis along with impulse response
functions. Such analysis allows for exact assessment of intensity and duration
of transmission of shocks generated in one market into other markets. In
essence, the VAR model explains the evolution of the dependent variable, in
our case local bond yield, based on its own lags and the lags of independent
variables, that is, German bond yields.
Our VAR model estimates linear interdependencies in the multivariable
setting based on daily changes in government bond yields. We use Thomson
Reuters Datastream daily government bond yields data for the maximum
available sample period 3 January 2001–23 July 2013 (for Slovenia the data
availability begins with the inception of its secondary bond market trading on
18 March 2003). The strength and length of shocks transmitted from the euro
area to individual CEE bond markets are reflected by impulse response
functions generated from our VAR model and shown in Figure 2. The VAR
model has been optimized for lag intervals by minimizing the Schwartz
Information Criterion. We also apply a Monte Carlo rather than an asymptotic
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Figure 2: Accumulated impulse responses of local 10Y government bond yields to a shock in German 10Y
GB yields
Notes: Daily changes in bond yields. Sample period 3 January 2001–23 July 2013 (except for Slovenia as
of 18 March 2003). Accumulated impulse responses are generated from VAR functions with 10 lag
intervals in unrestricted VAR, Monte Carlo distribution of response standard errors and 8-day diffusion,
optimized by minimizing Schwartz Information Criterion. From top-left to bottom-right, accumulated
responses of the Czech, Polish, Hungarian, Slovak and Slovenian 10Y government bond yields to Cholesky
1 standard deviation shock in German 10Y GB yields (with a 2 standard error band)
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on Thomson Reuters Datastream data
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distribution of errors, as this choice leads to more robust results. Optimized lag
intervals in unrestricted VAR along with the lag diffusion periods are specified
in notes to Figure 2. The impulse response functions show an accumulated
pattern of reactions of local bond yields to (Cholesky) 1 standard deviation
shock in the German bond yield over the 8-day time horizon. From the matrix
of all impulse responses generated from our VAR model, we are displaying
only those shocks originating in the German bond market and transmitted to
the bond markets of each of the five CEE countries.
The accumulated reactions of the Czech, Hungarian and Slovenian
markets to German-generated shocks are minimal, implying rather low capital
inflows from Germany to these three markets. In contrast, the reactions of the
Polish and, to a lesser extent, the Slovak bond yields to German shocks are
pronounced and positive, showing high susceptibility of these two markets to
the conditions in Germany resulting in high capital inflows.
In sum, convergence of CEE to German bond yields is not uniform. The
Czech government bond market shows strong co-movement with German
bonds, suggesting that the country is ready to join the euro without encounter-
ing potentially adverse shocks. Convergence of the Polish bond market, while
ongoing, is still incomplete. In contrast, convergence of the Hungarian yield is
still far from completion; thus the country does not seem to be ripe for adopting
the euro.
CORRELATION OF EQUITY MARKETS
We now examine co-movements of equity markets. More specifically, we study
correlation of stock returns as measured by daily changes in logs of stock market
indexes, that is, the Czech’s Prague SEPX, the Polish WIG20, the Hungarian
BUDINDX, the Slovak Bratislava SAX16, the Slovenian Ljubljana Blue Chip SBI
and the German DAX40. We use daily Thomson Reuters Datastream data for the
sample period 3 January 2001–26 July 2013 (for Slovenia the data availability
begins on 31 March 2006). Table 2 shows correlation of returns of each of the
local and the German equity market for the same subperiods that we applied to
the bond markets analysis in the previous section.
As shown in Table 2, CEE equity market returns were positively, but not
strongly correlated with the German market returns during the pre-EU
accession period. Following the accession, equity market returns for the three
non-euro countries that are pursuing independent monetary policies became
increasingly correlated. At the same time, returns in Slovak and Slovenian
markets show minimal correlation with returns in Germany. During our latest
analyzed period, Slovakia shows even mildly negative correlation. Therefore,
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it seems that Slovakia and Slovenia as small euro-area countries with low-
capitalized equity markets may attract capital from investors seeking higher
returns. Such capital inflows are likely to have short-term investment horizon,
and thusQ7 be more volatile. These are typical characteristics of frontier equity
markets4 that Slovenia and Slovakia resemble.
We now look at the correlation of CEE and the US stock markets. As shown
in Table 2, correlations of daily returns between the local and the US markets
are lower than those between the local and German markets, particularly for
the three ‘euro outs’.
To gain further insights into transmission of shocks in equity markets, as
we have done in our analysis of bond markets shock transmission, we apply
the VAR analysis and impulse response functions. The VAR model allows us to
assess the interdependence between the equity market returns of CEE
countries and Germany as well as the United States. Again, we use daily
Thomson Reuters Datastream data for the sample period 3 January 2001–26
Table 2: Correlation coefficientsQ13 between daily returns (changes in logs) in local versus German and US
equity markets
Correlation between
market returns of
and German DAX and US DJIA
3 January 2000–30
April 2004
(pre-EU accession)
3 May 2004–15
August 2007
(accession to crisis)
16 August 2007–26
July 2013
(crisis to recent)
16 August 2007–26
July 2013
(crisis to recent)
Czech Republic 0.337 0.595 0.599 0.376
Poland 0.367 0.548 0.656 0.425
Hungary 0.395 0.532 0.599 0.420
Slovakia 0.253 0.098 −0.014 0.006
Slovenia NA 0.096 0.234 0.113
Notes: Daily market indexes are stated as changes in logs. Sample period: 3 January 2001–26 July 2013,
3541 observations, (except for 31 March 2006–26 July 2013 for Slovenia). Stock market indexes are:
Frankfurt DAX40, New York DJIA, Prague SE PX, Warsaw WIG20, Budapest BUDINDX, Bratislava SAX16,
Ljubljana Blue Chip SBI.
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on Thomson Reuters Datastream data
4 By definition, frontier equity markets are those that have lower market capitalization and
liquidity than the more developed markets, thus they attract investors seeking higher long-term
returns as these markets exhibit low correlation with the larger markets. See for instance Amin and
Orlowski (2014) for a detailed analysis of low correlations of returns between South Asian frontier
markets and the leading global equity markets. Although the term ‘frontier markets’ is normally
applied to emerging financial markets, their characteristics seem to fit to the low-capitalized euro-
periphery markets that attract similar type of investors from the more developed core euro area
markets.
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July 2013 (for Slovenia the data availability begins on 31 March 2006). The
impulse response functions generated by our VAR model through the same
optimization process as in the previous section are shown in Figures 3a and 3b.
In Figure 3a, the impulse, that is, a Cholesky 1 standard deviation shock in
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Figure 3: (a) Accumulated impulse responses of changes in local stock market indexes to a shock in the
German DAX40
Notes: Daily market indexes are stated as changes in logs (Δlogs). Sample period: 3 January 2001–26
July 2013, 3541 observations, (except for 31 March 2006–26 July 2013 for Slovenia). From top-left,
responses of: Prague SE PX, Warsaw WIG20, Budapest BUDINDX, Bratislava SAX16, Ljubljana Blue Chip
SBI Top, to a Cholesky 1 standard deviation shock in German DAX40 (with a 2 standard error band). VAR
model specification: 6 lag intervals in unrestricted VAR, Monte Carlo distribution of errors, with a 6-day
diffusion, optimized by minimizing Schwartz Information Criterion
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on Thomson Reuters Datastream data
(b) Accumulated impulse responses of changes in local stock market indexes to a shock in the US DJIA
Notes: Daily market indexes are stated as changes in logs. Sample period: 3 January 2000–26 July 2013,
3541 observations, (except for 31 March 2006–26 July 2013 for Slovenia). From top-left, responses of:
Prague SE PX, Warsaw WIG20, Budapest BUDINDX, Bratislava SAX16, Ljubljana Blue Chip SBI Top, to a
Cholesky 1 standard deviation shock in DJIA (with a 2 standard error band). VAR model specification as
in Table 3a
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on Thomson Reuters Datastream data
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returns generated in the German DAX, has a strong positive impact on returns
in the Polish, Czech, Hungarian and Slovenian markets. However, there is no
discernible transmission of shocks from the German to Slovak markets. The
Slovak case resembles a typical case of shock transmission pattern from the
leading to the frontier capital markets (Amin and Orlowski, 2014).
Patterns of accumulated impulse responses of CEE equity market returns
to shocks generated in the United State are shown in Figure 3b. Notably, the
absorption of the US-generated shocks is stronger than that of the German
shocks for all five CEE markets. Moreover, the shock transmission from the
United States to the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia is more
instantaneous, showing a 1-day lag only. In contrast, the absorption of German
shocks is spread over a 4-day period. The responses of the Slovak market to
external shocks are the weakest within the CEE group of countries.
On the basis of the Slovak case, we draw a conclusion that patterns of
correlations and the shock transmission in equity markets for the non-euro
CEE countries may change once they adopt the euro. Correlations of their
equity market returns with those of the German market may become lower or
even negative, as these markets may be treated by investors as euro-periphery,
or even euro-frontier equity markets. Such potential change in the equity
market status should be taken into consideration in the determination of the
actual timing of the euro adoption.
The equity market interdependence and interactions have a strong impact
on integration of the banking sectors, as the leading banks in CEE become
increasingly exposed to security holdings of the euro-area institutions, and
therefore to sovereign risk problems in the common European currency system.
INTEGRATION OF BANKING SECTORS
In this section, we examine the degree of integration between the core EU and
CEE banking sectors.5 A comprehensive assessment of this integration goes
beyond the scope of our study, therefore, we focus only on selected aspects of
this integration that relate directly to the depth and scope of financial markets’
integration. Specifically, we discuss: (1) the foreign bank participation as
reflected by the share of foreign (core EU) bank assets in total bank assets in
CEE countries, (2) spreads between the euro area and CEE bank lending rates
and (3) trends in euro-area financing for banks.
The transformation of the bank industry in the CEE dating back to the early
1990s brought on macroeconomic instability. It stemmed from the severance of
5 For the evolution of the CEE banking sector, see Bonin et al. (2013).
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economic ties with previous economic partners that compounded the existing
distortions in the new banking systems and resulted in a series of banking
crises (Vinhas de Souza, 2004).
The common policy actions aimed at improving liquidity and solvency of
the CEE banking sectors included the privatization and consolidation. While
specific approaches to privatization varied from country to country, the
resources and expertise required for consolidation were mostly provided by
large Western European banks, in exchange for entry into these fast growing
markets. As the total number of banks in those markets fell, reflecting the
consolidation process, the share of assets owned by foreign banks increased
very significantly, as shown in Figure 4.
Looking at the ownership structure of the CEE banks, we can see that the
foreign banks that dominate those markets are from the EU, and especially
from the euro area, as shown in Table 3. Slovakia has the highest share of the
euro-area banks, with Austrian-based institutions accounting for almost
40% of total banking sector assets, followed by 25% of Italian-based banksQ8
(Raiffeisen Bank International, 2012). Financial institutions from these two
euro-area countries play also an important role in other CEE countries. Among
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Figure 4: Asset share of foreign-owned banks (in percent)
Source: ECB and EUROSTAT
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institutions.
Despite the fact that Slovenia has been a member of the euro since 2006,
the share of non-domestic euro-area banking assets is by far the smallest,
which is explained by state ownership of the two largest banks in the country.
On the other hand, Slovakia, which has also adopted the euro, has the lowest
share of non-euro-area banking assets. Thus, membership in the euro area has
no direct impact on the degree of participation of euro-area banks in these two
countries, as the shares of euro-area banks in total bank assets do not differ
significantly from those in the non-euro CEE countries.
However, there is an important operational distinction in the role of
foreign banks operating in CEE and those operating in Western euro area.
Foreign banks in CEE are involved mainly in retail banking operations,
while their engagement in wholesale banking is more pronounced in Western
euro-area countries. Moreover, the CEE banks are generally more profitable,
better capitalized and less reliant on wholesale funding than those in the euro
area (Raiffeisen Bank International, 2012).
To assess the degree of integration of the banking sectors, we analyze
spreads of nominal lending rates between CEE countries and the euro-area
averages, specifically nominal interest rates on loans to non-financial corpora-
tions (Figure 5). 6 In the five examined CEE countries, lending rate spreads fell
significantly right after their May 2004 EU accession. They continued to decline
until the first quarter of 2008 when the repercussions from the global financial
crisis began to affect the region. More recently, the spreads are the highest in
Hungary, reflecting the prevalence of credit and sovereign default risks in this
Table 3: Share of foreign bank assets in total bank assets (2009 data)
Czech
Republic
Poland Hungary Slovakia Slovenia
EU share in total bank assets 78 54 50.1 89.2 28.1
Non-EU share of total bank assets (largely US and
Russian)
9.1 8.9 40.5 5.1 8.5
Foreign banks share in bank assets 87.1 62.9 90.6 94.3 36.6
EU share in all foreign bank assets 89.6 85.8 55.3 94.6 76.7
State-owned banks share in total assetsa 3 21.5 5.3 8.2 20.1
aAverage share of state-owned banks for this peer group is 11.62% of total assets.
Data Source: European Central Bank (ECB) andQ14 Raiffeisen Bank International, 2012
6 Data source: the ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse, http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?
node=9484266.
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economy. They are lower, yet still elevated in Poland. In both countries the
spreads have been recently increasing. In contrast, the lending rate spreads
have been declining and reaching near zero levels in Slovakia, Slovenia and
the Czech Republic, as these countries are attaining a low credit risk environ-
ment comparable to that in the core euro area.
Further insights are provided by the correlations between the CEE
countries rates and the weighted average euro-area rate on loans to non-financial
corporations shown in Table 4. Such correlation has recently declined for the
Czech Republic, indicating an effective decoupling of the Czech banking sector
from the recent credit risk problems in the euro area. The same correlation for
Poland shows a remarkably steady path. For the remaining three countries, the
correlation has increased significantly, indicating a stronger co-movement in
credit risk, particularly in the countries that have already adopted the euro, that
is, Slovenia and Slovakia.
Widening premiums on lending rates shown in Figure 5 suggest a setback
in financial integration in some CEE countries over the past few years. This
trend is also observable in Figure 6, which shows the total deposits by financial
institutions (monetary financial institutions MFIs, excluding the ESCB –
European System of Central Banks), money market funds (MMFs) and debt
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Figure 5: Spreads between local and euro-area weighted average nominal interest rates on loans to non-
financial corporations
Source: ECB and EUROSTAT
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issued in CEE banks, as a proxy measure of total capital inflows from the euro
area. More recently, euro-area capital outflows from the CEE banking sectors
have accelerated, in response to the deepening sovereign debt crisis in the euro
area and increasing counter-party risk in the EU banking sector. Upon eruption
of the euro crisis in mid-2009, the financial intermediation fell in all five
countries (Hasan et al., 2013). Since mid-2010, it has fallen particularly in
Hungary in response to its worsening macroeconomic fundamentals and to
adverse domestic policies, most notably, the transferring of the exchange rate
costs from non-Forint mortgages from households to banks.
Table 4: Correlations between local and weighted-average euro-area rates on loans to non-financial
corporations (average for the period, 3-month rolling windows)
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovenia Slovakia
July 2010–November 2013: EA crisis 0.11 0.27 0.28 0.60 0.39
March 2003–June 2008: Pre-global crisis 0.41 0.06 0.28 0.52 0.55
March 2003–June 2010: Pre-EA crisis 0.38 0.14 0.24 0.46 0.51
March 2003–April 2004: Pre-EU accession 0.36 −0.42 0.28 0.43 0.22
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on ECB data (http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=
9484266)
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In sum, there is no straightforward conclusion concerning integration of
the CEE and euro-area banking sectors. The individual countries and their
banking sectors are at different stages of business cycle, have different
regulatory policy frameworks, show a non-uniform sensitivity to exogenous
shocks and have different status concerning the euro-area membership.
Nevertheless, we can summarize the results of our indicators, that is, the
market share of euro-area banks in respective CEE countries, the spread in
nominal interest rate on loans to non-financial corporations (a price-based
indicator) and trends in euro-area financing for banks (a quantity based
indicator) in the following terms. We observe that the Czech Republic and
Poland have held up better in terms of banking integration measures than the
euro-area members, that is, Slovakia and Slovenia, while Hungary, dominated
by country-specific shocks, lags behind all the others.
We conclude that the level of banking integration with the euro area is
conditional on more complex factors than merely on the euro adoption.
It depends also on fundamentals, market structure and regulatory policy
frameworks.
CONCLUSION
We argue that integration of financial markets is essential for subsequent
monetary integration. Following this assumption, we examine integration of
government bond and equity markets, as well as the banking sectors of five
CEE countries with the euro-area core as represented by Germany. We note
that financial integration is an important prerequisite for a successful adoption
of the euro by the candidate countries, as it would allow them to mitigate
systemic risk and shield them from potentially destabilizing shocks.
Our analysis shows substantial progress in bond yield convergence of CEE
countries before their 2004 EU accession and until the outbreak of the recent
global financial crisis in August 2007. The crisis disrupted integration, par-
ticularly for Hungary whose macroeconomic fundamentals are weaker, as
reflected by its higher sovereign risk premium. On an optimistic note, bond
market integration for all examined countries with the exception of Slovenia
has been gaining traction since 2012. The Czech bond market is now fully
aligned with the German market, showing eliminated sovereign risk premium.
The Polish bond market is again on the right convergence path. Arguably, the
Czech Republic and Poland may be now ripe to adopt the euro without
encountering adverse effects of contagion from the euro-periphery.
We further demonstrate that equity markets of the non-euro CEE countries
are highly correlated with global equity markets, as proxied by the US market,
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and to a lesser extent with the German market. We argue that correlation and
the shock transmission in equity markets of these countries may change once
they adopt the euro. Correlations of their equity market returns with those of
the German market may become lower or even negative, as these markets may
be treated by investors as euro-periphery, or even euro-frontier equity markets.
Integration of the banking sectors depends on fundamentals, market
structure and policy frameworks and not merely on the euro adoption. A
country with more robust macroeconomic and regulatory conditions is prone
to be more resilient to both internal and external adverse shocks.
The recent financial crisis has disrupted integration of CEE financial
markets and institutions with those in the euro area. The CEE countries may
still choose to strengthen their institutional resilience and pursue disciplined
macroeconomic policies before moving to adopt the euro.
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